TheMargin Gap
A CUSTOMER ACQUISITION BUSINESS
WEARING A FOOD LABEL
Direct to consumer brands love quoting gross margin and I have started reading that as a small act of misdirection. Huel's is fifty nine percent, which sounds like a software company wearing an apron. Its adjusted EBITDA margin the same year was about eight. Huel is not a food business. It is a customer acquisition business with a product attached, and what Danone bought is the right to stop paying for the acquisition.
Where the fifty one points go
I train for a half Ironman and race HYROX, so complete nutrition is a category I watch as a person and not only as somebody reading filings. Danone announced in March 2026 at around eight hundred and sixty million pounds and the CMA cleared it that August.
In the year to 2024 Huel recorded two hundred and fourteen million pounds of revenue at a fifty nine percent gross margin and eighteen point two million of adjusted EBITDA. Revenue reached two hundred and fifty million the following year, up sixteen percent. Fifty nine percent of two hundred and fourteen is about a hundred and twenty six million of gross profit against eighteen of EBITDA, so roughly a hundred and eight million pounds, close to half of all revenue, leaves below the gross line. In a subscription business selling direct, the overwhelming share of that is the cost of finding the next customer. Huel is not expensive to make. Huel is expensive to sell.
Which makes the synergy mechanical rather than cultural
I am ordinarily sceptical of synergy arguments because they are the easiest slide in any deck and the hardest line to find afterwards. This one is different for a structural reason. If the cost sitting between fifty nine and eight is distribution, then shelf space is a direct substitute for paid acquisition, and Danone happens to own shelf space in quantity.
You are not hoping two organisations learn to collaborate. You are swapping a cost line for an asset the buyer already holds, which is the only kind of synergy I take seriously. And it gives a test needing no model at all: EBITDA margin should climb from eight toward the gross margin over three years. If it does, the thesis was right. If it has not moved, Danone bought revenue at a food multiple and inherited the advertising budget with it.
The argument against my own thesis
The gap only closes if the loyalty survives the move. A brand built on a subscription relationship does not always hold up on a shelf beside eleven alternatives, and some of what looks like brand strength in those numbers may be a function of the format rather than the formula.
If that is true then the acquisition cost was never really waste, it was the price of a relationship, and removing it removes the thing being bought. That is a hypothesis rather than a finding, and it is why I would watch subscriber retention as closely as the margin.
My call
The best articulated thesis on my list and the easiest to grade, which are related virtues. Fifty nine into eight is the entire deal. Either Danone closes that gap or it did not need to own the company to find out.
Huel is not expensive to make. Huel is expensive to sell, and that is what changed hands.

Sources
- Danone announcement March 2026; CMA clearance August 2026; consideration of approximately 860m from reporting.
- Huel FY2024 revenue, gross margin and adjusted EBITDA, and FY2025 revenue, per company figures reported in trade coverage.