Two versusSix
THE MULTIPLE PRICES COPYABILITY,
NOT GROWTH AND NOT CATEGORY
People discuss the wellness trade as though it were one thing you could be long or short, and this year handed me the cleanest disproof I am likely to get. One sponsor, one calendar year, two health brands riding the same demand, priced at roughly two times revenue going in and roughly six times coming out. The multiple in this category is not pricing growth, and it is not pricing the category. It is pricing whether somebody else can make the same thing.
A natural experiment I did not have to construct
In January 2026 L Catterton took a majority stake in Good Culture, the cottage cheese brand, at a reported value above five hundred million dollars. Good Culture did about a hundred million of revenue in 2023, close to double that in 2024, and was tracking near two hundred and fifty million in 2025, so roughly two times sales. Semcap Food and Nutrition added fifty five million that February.
In August the same firm sold Thorne to Procter and Gamble at a reported three point eight billion against roughly six hundred and fifty million of forward revenue, about five point eight times. Same investor, same year, same broad bet that people are buying health. Four turns of difference.
Two explanations that do not survive
Growth was my first instinct and it fails immediately. Good Culture roughly doubled. That is not a business being marked down for stalling.
Category was my second and it fails too. Both are things people put in their body deliberately, sold on a health claim, riding the same protein and longevity demand, and if anything cottage cheese has had the louder cultural moment. So whatever produces a four turn spread is not the thing the category label names, which is my central objection to talking about a wellness trade at all.
What is left is copyability
Cottage cheese is a refrigerated commodity with a cold chain, a short shelf life and a private label version on the same shelf at a lower price. A competitor can match the product. The brand is real and the execution is plainly excellent, but the moat is thin by construction and no amount of growth thickens it.
Thorne's moat was a practitioner willing to say the name out loud to a patient who was frightened. You cannot private label that and you cannot rebuild it once spent. Four turns of revenue is the price of that difference, and it is a far more useful number than anything in the category commentary.
The argument against my own thesis
I may be reading a sponsor's portfolio timing as a market judgement. L Catterton bought one asset and exited another, and exit timing owes as much to fund cycles and a closed IPO window as to anything I am claiming about moats.
I would rather raise that than have it raised for me. It does not fully defeat the read, because a fund cycle explains when you choose to sell and not what somebody is willing to pay when you do, but it is the strongest thing anyone could say against me.
My call
Two was right for Good Culture and six was right for Thorne. If you want to know what a consumer health brand is worth, do not ask how fast it is growing. Ask whether somebody could make it for less, and whether anyone would notice.
Ask whether somebody could make it for less, and whether anyone would notice. That is the multiple.
Sources
- L Catterton majority investment in Good Culture announced January 2026, reported above 500m; Semcap Food and Nutrition investment of 55m, February 2026.
- Good Culture revenue scale from trade coverage. Thorne figures as set out in my separate note on that transaction.